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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Documents released over the past year detailing the National Security Agency’s 
telephony metadata collection program and interception of international content under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) directly implicated U.S. high 
technology companies in government surveillance.
1
  The result was an immediate, and 
detrimental, impact on U.S. firms, the economy, and U.S. national security. 
The first Snowden documents, printed June 5, 2013, revealed that the U.S. 
government had served orders on Verizon, directing the company to turn over 
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
2
  The following 
day, The Guardian published classified slides detailing how the NSA had intercepted 
international content under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
3
  The type of 
information obtained ranged from E-mail, video and voice chat, videos, photos, and 
stored data, to Voice over Internet Protocol, file transfers, video conferencing, 
notifications of target activity, and online social networking details.
4
  The companies 
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3 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google, 
and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech- giants-nsa-data. 
4 Id. 
 2 
involved read like a who’s who of U.S. Internet giants:  Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, 
Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple.
5
   
More articles highlighting the extent to which the NSA had become embedded in 
the U.S. high tech industry followed.  In September 2013 ProPublica and the New 
York Times revealed that the NSA had enjoyed considerable success in cracking 
commonly-used cryptography.
6
  The following month the Washington Post reported 
that the NSA, without the consent of the companies involved, had obtained millions of 
customers’ address book data:  in one day alone, some 444,743 email addresses from 
Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from Facebook, 33,697 from Gmail, and 
22,881 from other providers.
7
  The extent of upstream collection stunned the public – 
as did slides demonstrating how the NSA had bypassed the companies’ encryption, 
intercepting data as it transferred between the public Internet and the Google cloud.
8
   
Further documents suggested that the NSA had helped to promote encryption 
standards for which it already held the key or whose vulnerabilities the NSA 
understood but not taken steps to address.
9
  Beyond this, press reports indicated that 
the NSA had at times posed as U.S. companies—without their knowledge—in order 
to gain access to foreign targets.  In November 2013 Der Spiegel reported that the 
NSA and the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
had created bogus versions of Slashdot and LinkedIn, so that when employees from 
the telecommunications firm Belgacom tried to access the sites from corporate 
computers, their requests were diverted to the replica sites that then injected malware 
into their machines.
10
 
As a result of growing public awareness of these programs, U.S. companies have 
lost revenues, even as non-U.S. firms have benefited.
11
  In addition, numerous 
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9 James Ball, Julian Borger, and Glenn Greenwald, Revealed:  How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat 
Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, available at 
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10 Steven Levy, How the US Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED, Jan. 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.wired.com/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/. 
11 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions, TIME, Dec. 10, 2013, 
available at http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/.  
(“The National Security Agency spying scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of dollars 
over the next several years, according to industry experts.  In addition to consumer Internet companies, 
hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer billions of dollars 
in losses.”);  Ellen Messmer, U.S. High-Tech Industry feeling the Heat from Edward Snowden Leaks, 
NETWORKWORLD, Jul. 19, 2013 (“The disclosures about the National Security Agency’s massive global 
surveillance by Edward Snowden, the former information-technology contractor who’s now wanted by 
the U.S. government for treason, is hitting the U.S. high-tech industry hard as it tries to explain its 
involvement in the NSA data-collection program.”); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying 
Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-
companies.html?_r=0  (writing, “Despite the tech companies’ assertions that they provide information on 
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countries, concerned about consumer privacy as well as the penetration of U.S. 
surveillance efforts in the political sphere, have accelerated localization initiatives, 
begun restricting U.S. companies’ access to local markets, and introduced new 
privacy protections—with implications for the future of Internet governance and U.S. 
economic growth.  These effects raise attendant concerns about U.S. national security.  
Congress has an opportunity to redress the current situation in at least three ways.  
First, and most importantly, reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would 
provide for greater restrictions on NSA surveillance.  Second, new domestic 
legislation could extend better protections to consumer privacy.  These shifts would 
allow U.S. industry legitimately to claim a change in circumstance, which would help 
them to gain competitive ground.  Third, the integration of economic concerns at a 
programmatic level within the national security infrastructure would help to ensure 
that economic matters remain central to national security determinations in the future. 
 
II.  ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS 
 
Billions of dollars are on the line because of worldwide concern that the services 
provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither secure nor private.
12
  
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in cloud computing.  Approximately 50% 
of the worldwide revenues previously came from the United States.
13
  The domestic 
market more than tripled in value 2008-2014.
14
  But within weeks of the Snowden 
documents, reports had emerged that U.S. companies such as Dropbox, Amazon Web 
Services, and Microsoft’s Azure were losing business.15  By December 2013, ten 
percent of the Cloud Security Alliance had cancelled U.S. cloud services projects as a 
result of the Snowden information.
16
  In January 2014 a survey of Canadian and 
British businesses found that one quarter of the respondents were moving their data 
outside the United States.
17
  The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 
estimates that declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and 
data storage alone could reach $35 billion over the next three years.
18
  Other 
commentators, such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put actual losses 
                                                                                                                                                  
their customers only when required under law – and not knowingly through a back door – the perception 
that they enabled the spying program has lingered.”)   
12 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UPI, Dec. 17, 2013, available at 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-set-to-lose-billions-
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billions of dollars of business because of concerns their services are neither secure nor private.”). 
13 Gartner Predict Cloud computing Spending to Increase by 100% in 2016, Says AppsCare, PR WEB, 
July 19, 2012, available at http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/7/prweb9711167.htm. 
14 Id. 
15 David Gilbert, Companies Turn to Switzerland for Cloud Storage Following NSA Spying Revelations, 
INT’L BUSINESS TIMES, July 4, 2013, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/business-turns-away-
dropbox-towards-switzerland-nsa-486613. 
16 Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Opinion:  NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would 
Have the Foundign Fathers “Aghast,” FORBES, Dec. 20, 2013, available at 
http://snewsi.com/id/1342616710/NSA-Snoopings-Negative-Impact-On-Business-Would-Have-The-
Founding-Fathers-Aghast. 
17 NSA Scandal:  UK and Canadian Business Wary of Storing Data in the US, PEER 1 HOSTING, Jan. 8, 
2014. 
18 Id.  See also Mary DeRosa, U.S. Cloud Services Companies Are Paying Dearly for NSA Leaks, TECH 
INSIDER, Mar. 24, 2014, available at http://www.nextgov.com/voices/mary-derosa/8437/ (reporting 
estimates of losses of $22 billion over the next three years). 
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as high as $180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to restore confidence in data 
held by U.S. companies.
19
   
The economic impact of the NSA programs extends beyond cloud computing to 
the high technology industry.  Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett-
Packard have all reported declining sales as a direct result of the NSA programs.
20
  
Servint, a webhosting company based in Virginia, reported in June 2014 that its 
international clients had dropped by 50% since the leaks began.
21
  Also in June, the 
German government announced that because of Verizon’s complicity in the NSA 
program, it would end its contract with the company, which had previously provided 
services to a number of government departments.
22
  As a senior analyst at the 
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explained, “It’s clear to every 
single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line.” 23   The European 
commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts that the fallout for U.S. 
businesses in the EU alone will amount to billions of Euros.
24
   
Not only are U.S. companies losing customers, but they have been forced to spend 
billions to add encryption features to their services.  IBM has invested more than a 
billion dollars to build data centers in London, Hong Kong, Sydney, and elsewhere, in 
an effort to reassure consumers outside the United States that their information is 
protected from U.S. government surveillance.
25
  Salesforce.com made a similar 
announcement in March 2014.
26
  Google moved to encrypt terms entered into its 
browser.
27
  And in June 2014 the company released the source code for End-to-End, 
its newly-developed browser plugin that allows users to encrypt email prior to it being 
sent across the Internet.
28
  The following month Microsoft announced Transport Layer 
Security for inbound and outbound email, and Perfect Forward Secrecy encryption for 
access to OneDrive.
29
  Together with the establishment of a Transparency Center, 
where foreign governments could review source code to assure themselves of the 
integrity of Microsoft software, the company sought to put an end to both NSA back 
door surveillance and doubt about the integrity of Microsoft products.
30
  
                                                        
19 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UPI, Dec. 17, 2013, available at 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-set-to-lose-billions-
because-of-privacy-concerns/UPI-30251387333206/.  This number includes domestic customers who 
may go elsewhere to find greater privacy protections. See Gustin, supra note 11. 
20 Sean Gallagher, NSA Leaks Blamed for Cisco’s Falling Sales Overseas, ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 10, 2013; 
Paul Taylor, Cisco Warns Emerging Market Weakness is no Blip, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013; Spencer E. 
Ante, Qualcomm CEO Says NSA Fallout Impacting China Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013; Miller, 
supra note 11. 
21 Julian Hattem, Tech Takes Hit from NSA, THE HILL, June 30, 2014. 
22 Andrea Peterson, German Government to Drop Verizon over NSA spying Fears, WASH. POST, June 26, 
2014. 
23 Id. 
24 Eoyang et al, supra note 16. 
25 Miller, supra note 11. 
26 Id. 
27 Danny Sullivan, Post-PRISM, Google Confirms Quietly Moving to Make All Searches Secure, Except 
for Ad Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, Sept. 23, 2013, available at http://searchengineland.com/post-
prism-google-secure-searches-172487. 
28 Klint Finley, Google Renews Battle With the NSA by Open Sourcing Email Encryption Tool, WIRED, 
June 3, 2014, available at http://www.wired.com/2014/06/end-to-end/. 
29 Matt Thomlinson, Vice President Trustworthy Computing Security, Microsoft, Advancing our 
Encryption and Transparency Efforts, Press Release, available at http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2014/07/01/advancing-our-encryption-and-transparency-efforts/.  See also Carly Page, Microsoft 
Installs Tougher Outlook and Onedrive Encryption to Curb NSA Snooping, THE INQUIRER, Jul. 1, 2014, a 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2353073/microsoft-installs-better-outlook-and-onedrive-
encryption-to-curb-nsa-snooping. 
30 Id. 
 5 
Foreign technology companies, in turn, are seeing revenues increase.
31
  Runbox, 
for instance, an email service based in Norway and a direct competitor to Gmail and 
Yahoo, almost immediately made it publicly clear that it does not comply with foreign 
court requests for its customers’ personal information. 32  Its customer base increased 
34% in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations.
33
 Mateo Meier, CEO of Artmotion 
(Switzerland’s biggest offshore data hosting company), reported that within the first 
month of the Snowden releases, the company saw a 45% rise in revenue.
34
  Because 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the only way to access data in a Swiss data 
center is as a result of an official court order demonstrating guilt or liability; there are 
no exceptions for the United States.
35
  In April 2014, Brazil and the European Union, 
which previously used U.S. firms to supply undersea cables for transoceanic 
communications, decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal, using 
Spanish and Brazilian companies in the process.
36
  OpenText, Canada’s largest 
software company, now guarantees customers that their data remains outside the 
United States.  Deutsche Telekom, a cloud computing provider, is similarly gaining 
more customers.
37
  In sum, numerous foreign companies are marketing their products 
as “NSA proof” or “safer alternatives” to those offered by U.S. firms, gaining market 
share in the process.
38
 
 
III.  FOREIGN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
 
The Snowden documents revealed not just the extent to which high technology 
companies had become coopted, but that the targets of NSA surveillance include both 
allied and non-allied countries.
39
  The resulting backlash has led some commentators 
to raise concern that “the Internet will never be the same.”40  Jurisdictional questions 
and national borders previously marked the worldwide Internet discussions.
41
  
Countries, however, are now using the disclosures to restrict data storage to national 
borders, making it more difficult for the United States to gain access.
42
  As risk is the 
balkanization of the Internet, undermining its traditional culture of open access, and 
increasing the cost of doing business.
43
 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 Miller, supra note 11. 
33 Id. 
34 Gilbert, supra note 15. 
35 Id. 
36 Miller, supra note 11. 
37 Id. 
38 Mark Scott, European Firms Turn Privacy into Sales Pitch, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014. 
39 See, e.g., Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Fidelius Schmid and Holger Stark, NSA Spied on European 
Union Offices, DER SPIEGEL, June 29, 2013; Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, 
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2013, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-documents-show-how-the-us-
spies-on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html; EXCUSIVE:  US spies on Chinese Mobile Phone Companies, 
Steals SMS Data:  Edward Snowden, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1266821/us-hacks-chinese-mobile-phone-companies-steals-
sms-data-edward-snowden; Lana Lam, US Hacked Pacnet, Asia Pacific Fibre-Optic Network Operator, 
in 2009, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HONG KONG), June 23, 2013; Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, 
NEW NSA LEAKS SHOW HOW US IS BUGGING ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 30, 
2013. 
40 Levy, supra note 10. 
41 See, e.g., Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and National Data Sovereignty, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, June 2012. 
42 Levy, supra note 10. 
43 Id. 
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A.  Data Localization and Data Protection 
 
Countries around the world are increasingly adopting data localization laws, 
restricting the storage, analysis, and transfer of digital information to national 
borders.
44
  To some extent, the use of barriers to trade as a means of incubating tech-
based industries predated the Snowden releases.
45
  However, in the aftermath of the 
leaks, the dialogue has accelerated.  The asserted purpose is to protect both 
government data and consumer privacy.  
As of the time of writing, China, Greece, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, and others have already implemented local data server 
requirements.
46
  Turkey has introduced new privacy regulations preventing the 
transfer of personal data (particularly locational data) overseas.
47
  Others, such as 
Argentina, India, and Indonesia are actively considering new laws, even as Brazilian 
president, Dilma Rousseff, has been promoting a law that would require citizens’ 
personal data to be stored within domestic bounds.
48
  Germany and France are 
considering a Schengen routing system, retaining as much online data in the European 
Union as possible.
49
 
As a regional matter, the EU Commission’s Vice President, Viviane Reding, is 
pushing for Europe to adopt more expansive privacy laws.
50
   And in March 2014 the 
European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and Directive, imposing 
strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’ data.  Regardless of where the information 
is based, those handling the data must obtain the consent of the data subjects to having 
their personal information processed.  They also retain the right to later withdraw 
consent.  Those violating the directive face steep fines, including up to five percent of 
revenues.   
In addition, the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the end of the US/EU Safe Harbor 
agreement.
51
  Some 3000 U.S. companies rely on this framework to conduct business 
with the EU.
52
   
                                                        
44 Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden:  Analysis and Recommendations for 
U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, 2(3) LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Jul. 21, 2014. 
45 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ezell, Robert D. Atkinson, and Michaelle A. Wein, Localization Barriers to 
Trade:  Threat to the Global Innovation Economy, The Information Technology & Innovation 
Foundation, Sept. 2013, available at http://copyrightalliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/2013-
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46 Sidley Austin, LLP., Privacy, Data Security and Information Law Update, Dec. 30, 2013, available at 
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32dee9163fed/Presentation/NewsAttachment/6d72f3e3-6b28-4d23-bc9a-
5493071c9b13/12.30.2013%20Privacy%20Update.pdf. 
47 Richard Chirgwin, USA Opposes “Schengen Cloud” Eurocentric Routing Plan, THE REGISTER (United 
Kingdom), Apr. 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/07/keeping_data_away_from_the_us_not_on_ustr/. 
48 Levy, supra note 10. 
49 See, e.g., Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE WELL, Feb. 20, 2014, 
available at http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a-17443482 ; 
Deutsche Telekom:  “Internet Data Made in Germany should Stay in Germany,” DEUTSCHE WELLE, Oct. 
18, 2013, available at http://www.dw.de/about-dw/who-we-are/s-3325. 
50 Mike Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Opinion:  NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would have 
the Founding Fathers “Aghast,” FORBES, Dec. 20, 2013. 
51 NSA Snooping;  MEPS TABLE PROPOSALS TO PROTECT EU CITIZENS’ PRIVACY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
Feb. 12, 2014. 
52 Alex Byers, Tech Safe Harbor Under Fire in Europe, POLITICO MORNING TECH, Nov.  6, 2013. 
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In May 2014 the EU Court of Justice ruled that users have a “right to be 
forgotten” in their use of online search engines.  The case derived from a complaint 
lodged against a Spanish newspaper, as well as Google Spain and Google Inc., 
claiming that notice of the plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s search engine 
infringed his right to privacy because the incident had been fully addressed years 
before.  He requested that the newspaper be required to remove or alter the pages in 
question to excise data related to him, and that Google Spain or Google Inc. be 
required to remove the information.  The EU court found that even where the physical 
server of a company processing information is not located in Europe, as long as the 
company has a branch or subsidiary and is doing business in a Member state, the 1995 
Data Protection Directive applies.
53
  Because search engines contain personal data, 
they are subject to such data protection laws.  The Court recognized that, under certain 
conditions, individuals have the “right to be forgotten”—i.e., the right to request that 
search engines remove links containing personal information.  Data that is inaccurate, 
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive may be removed.  Not absolute, the right to be 
forgotten must be weighed against competing rights, such as freedom of expression 
and the media. 
Various country-specific privacy laws are similarly poised to be introduced.  Their 
potential economic impact is not insubstantial:  the Information Technology and 
Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard the growth of the 
technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S. companies’ ability to 
expand and forcing them out of existing markets.
54
 
The current dialogue is merely the latest in a series of growing concerns about the 
absent of effective privacy protections within the U.S. legal regime.  High tech 
companies appear to see this as a potential step forward.  As Representative Justin 
Amash (MI-R), has explained, “Businesses increasingly recognize that our 
government’s out-of-control surveillance hurts their bottom line and costs American 
jobs.  It violates the privacy of their customers and it erodes American businesses’ 
competitive edge.”55   
It is with concern about the impact of lack of privacy controls on U.S. 
competitiveness in mind that in December 2013 some of the largest U.S. Internet 
companies launched a campaign to pressure the government to reform the NSA 
surveillance programs.  Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith explained: “People 
won’t use technology they don’t trust.”  He added, “Governments have put this trust at 
risk, and governments need to help restore it.”  Numerous high technology CEOs 
supported the initiative, such Google’s Larry Page, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer, and 
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.56  The aim is to limit government authority to collect 
user data, to institute better oversight and accountability, to ensure greater 
transparency about what the government is requesting (and obtaining), to increase 
respect for the free flow of data across borders, and to avoid political clashes on a 
global scale.  Mayer, explained, “Recent revelations about government surveillance 
activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is time for the United States 
government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the world.”57 
 
 
                                                        
53 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
54 Michael Hickens, AMERICAN SPYING STYMIES TECH FIRMS, WALL STREET J., Feb. 18, 2014. 
55 Gustin, supra note 11 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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B.  Global Initiatives Regarding Internet Governance 
 
Apart from economic considerations, the backlash raises question about the future 
of Internet governance.  From the inception of the Internet, the U.S.-based Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web.  As 
time has progressed, and the Internet has become part of the global infrastructure, 
there have been calls from several nations to end U.S. dominance and to have the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an entity within the UN, become the 
governing body. The revelations have not only contributed further to such calls, but 
they have spurred increased discussion of the need for regional Internet control. 
Over the past decade, three main groups have emerged to vie for control of the 
Internet.  The first is centered on states, who consider the question in light of national 
sovereignty.  It is comprised of developing countries as well as large, emerging 
economies like China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa.
58
  It overlaps significantly 
with the Group of 77 (consisting of more than 100 countries which emerged from the 
non-aligned movement in the Cold War).  These states are critical of the United States 
and its dominant role in Internet governance and oppose private sector preeminence, 
on the grounds that they are pawns of the United States.  Emphasis instead is placed 
on the UN and the ITU as potential repositories of Internet authority.   
The second group is civil society.  The third is the private sector.  These groups 
both tend to support what is referred to as a “multistakeholder model:”  i.e., native 
Internet governance institutions that are generally nonprofit entities in the private 
sector.
59
  Membership includes both technical experts (e.g., ICANN and Regional 
Internet Registries), as well as multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft, Facebook, 
and AT&T).  Prior to the Snowden releases, Japan, the EU, and the US found 
themselves in this camp.  Civil society organizations emphasize Internet freedom, 
consumer privacy, and user rights—often bringing them into conflict with the states 
who comprise the G77-type group.
60
 
As one commentator explains, “This alignment of actors has been in place since 
the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) meetings.  But the 
Snowden NSA revelations seem to have destabilized this settled political 
alignment.”61   
In brief, ICANN and Brazil have formed an alliance, condemning U.S. actions.  
Concern about the latest revelations spurred a major conference in April 2014: i.e., the 
Global Multistakeholder Conference on the Future of Internet Governance.  The 
purpose of the meeting, which was held in Sao Paulo, was “to produce universal 
internet principles and an institutional framework for multistakeholder Internet 
governance.”62 
It is not clear how the newest shifts will be resolved—either temporarily or in the 
future.  But significant, and enormously important, questions have been raised by the 
Snowden revelations:  How should the Internet governance be structured to ensure 
legitimacy and compliance?  Who gets to make the decision about what such 
governance looks like?  Which bodies have the authority to establish future rules and 
procedures?  How are such bodies constituted and who selects their membership?   
                                                        
58 Milton Mueller and Ben Wagner, Finding a Formula for Brazil:  Representation and Legitimacy in 
Internet Governance, (2013), p. 3, available at http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/MiltonBenWPdraft_Final.pdf. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id., at 4. 
62 Id., at 1. 
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These questions are fundamentally at odds with the decentralization tendencies in 
the Internet—tendencies that have been exaggerated post-Snowden as a result of 
regional efforts to expand the local sphere of influence and to protect consumer and 
state privacy from U.S. surveillance. 
The U.S. government’s failure to address the situation domestically has 
undermined the tech industry.  Despite calls from the companies for legislative reform 
to address the breadth of the NSA programs,
63
 there has been no significant shift that 
would allow companies to approach their customers to say, with truth, that the 
situation has changed.   Resultantly, American companies are losing not just 
customers, but the opportunity to submit proposals for contracts for which they 
previously would have been allowed to compete.
64
  And the future of Internet 
governance hangs in the balance. 
 
IV.  ECONOMIC SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
The NSA programs illustrate lawmakers’ failure to recognize the degree to which 
economic strength is central to national security, as well as the importance of the high 
technology industry to the U.S. economy.  The concept of economic security as 
national security is not new:  the Framers and the generations that followed 
acknowledged the importance of economic strength as central to national security.  
Our more recent understandings, however, have gotten away from the concept, in the 
process cleaving important interests out of the calculations required to accurately 
understand the implications of government actions.  Unintended consequences have 
resulted:  the NSA revelations, for instance, may have driven bad actors to seek non-
U.S. companies for ISP services, creating gaps in insight into their operations.  They 
have also undermined U.S. efforts to call other countries to heel for their exploitation 
of international communications to gain advantages over U.S. industry.  In sum, the 
expansive nature of the programs may well have acted to undermine U.S. national 
security in myriad ways linked to the country’s economic interests. 
 
A.  Economic Security from the Founding 
 
Despite its appearance throughout U.S. history, the term “national security” is 
rarely defined.
65
  The 1947 National Security Act, for instance, which, inter alia, 
constituted the National Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense), and 
the National Security Council, refers to “national security” more than 100 times; yet it 
does not define the term.
66
  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
employs the term nearly a dozen times, to ascertain what matters fall within the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) purview, who can certify an 
application to FISC, and under what conditions in camera and ex parte proceedings 
can be held.
67
  Where the Attorney General ascertains that a national security threat 
exists, officials may secretly search and seize property—waiting notice otherwise 
required under the Fourth Amendment.
68
  But no definition is provided in FISA.  Nor 
                                                        
63 See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 11 (reporting that the nation’s largest Internet companies are calling for 
Congress and the Administration to reform the secret surveillance programs). 
64 Miller, supra note 11. 
65 See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 1579 (2011). 
66 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §401 
(2006)). 
67 50 U.S.C. §§1803(e), 1804(a), 1806(f), and 1845(f). 
68 50 USC §1825(b). 
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does the USA PATRIOT Act prove more illuminating—despite referring to national 
security more than two dozen times.
69
 
Where we do find definitions in the U.S. Code, they tend to limit consideration to 
foreign affairs and matters related to military strength.  Thus, under the Classified 
Information Procedures Act, “national security” is understood as involving matters 
related to the “national defense and foreign relations of the United States.”70  Nowhere 
does the definition reference U.S. economic security. 
In the amended National Security Act, while the term could potentially be 
understood to encompass U.S. economic security, the actual definition does not 
specify a precise link to economic vitality.  Instead, “intelligence related to national 
security” refers to: 
 
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including 
information gathered within or outside the United States, that 
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by 
the President, to more than one United States Government agency; 
and 
(B) that involves— 
(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; 
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion; or 
(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland 
security.
71
 
 
The Federal Information Security management Act of 2002 (providing rules for 
government-wide information security) similarly fails to consider the economic 
underpinnings of national security, instead, understanding national security systems as 
any system: 
 
(i) the function, operation, or use of which 
(I) involves intelligence activities; 
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security; 
(III) involves command and control of military forces; 
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or 
weapons system; or 
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of 
military or intelligence missions; or 
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that 
have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest 
of national defense or foreign policy.
72
 
 
While there may be room in the definition for economic considerations, they are not 
front and center. 
Executive Branch articulations prove little better.  President George W. Bush’s 
five-page National Security Presidential Directive 1 referred to “national security” 
                                                        
69 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505. 
70 Classified Information Procedures Act §1(b), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006). 
71 50 U.S.C.A. § 401a(5) (2012). 
72 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, § 201, 116 Stat. 2947 (2002) 
(codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(2)(A)). 
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thirty-three times, without any definition.
 73
  President Barak Obama’s Presidential 
Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1), in turn, addressing the National Security Council, referred 
to “national security” thirty-three times—without ever defining it.74  And like the 
Executive Branch, Courts tend to look to the military and diplomatic aspects of 
national security, instead of their economic concomitant.
75
 
Despite the lack of emphasis on economic strength, the Founders were well aware 
of the importance of the economy in fostering international independence.  The 
Articles of Confederation failed in significant part because the national government 
lacked the resources, and the country the economic strength, to protect the Union.  For  
Alexander Hamilton, absent military might, diplomatic stature, and commercial 
success, the country would cease to exist.
76
   
One of the first expansions of the executive, accordingly, was to include a 
Secretary of the Treasury, which, along with the Secretary of War and the 
establishment of the office of Attorney General, reflected the purposes for which 
Union had been sought:  foreign relations, military strength, economic growth, and the 
rule of law.  In his Farewell Address, President George Washington called for U.S. 
energies to be directed towards strengthening the U.S. economy:  “[T]he great rule of 
conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to 
have with them as little political connection as possible.”77   
The federal government was willing, from a very early date, to act in support of 
its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and military power it could 
muster.
78
  The Monroe Doctrine was premised largely on this approach.  In 1837 
President Martin Van Buren came to office determined to continue Washington’s 
legacy, underscoring the importance of avoiding entangling alliances while pursuing 
America’s economic interests abroad.79  President Zachary Taylor came to office in 
1849 determined to continue the course, emphasizing the importance of bolstering 
trade as a means of securing the country.
80
  The 1950 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ensured 
that future canal access through Central America would be open to international 
trade.
81
  As Millard Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he considered commerce central to 
U.S. interests abroad—for this reason, the Navy would require further resources to 
protect trade along the Pacific Coast.
82
  Upon taking office, President Franklin Pierce 
reiterated the same policies:  of the complicated European tumults and anxieties, the 
                                                        
73 George W. Bush, NSPD-1, National Security Presidential Directive 1:  Organization of the National 
Security Council System (2001). 
74 See Barack Obama, PSD-1, Presidential Study Directive 1:  Organizing for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf (“[C]onceptually 
and functionally, [national security and homeland security] should be thought of together rather than 
separately.”). 
75 See, e.g., See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring). 
76 FEDERALIST No. 1, (Alexander Hamilton). 
77 President George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796), 
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 6 (2d Sess. 2000) [hereinafter Washington, Farewell Address], 
http://www. access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf. 
78 For a catalog of every military intervention in support of U.S. commercial interests, see WILLIAM 
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE:  AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF 
AMERICA’S PRESENT PREDICAMENT ALONG WITH A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE (1st ed. 
1980). 
79 President Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1837). 
80 President Zachary Taylor, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1849). 
81  Convention Between the United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty (Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty), U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 19, 1850, 9 Stat. 995. 
82 President Millard Fillmore, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1850), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29491&st=fillmore&st1=#axzz1Wo2idoeG. 
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United States was to be exempt, “But the vast interests of commerce are common to 
all mankind, and the advantages of trade and international intercourse must always 
present a noble field for the moral influence of a great people.”  The United States 
went on to emphasize its dealings with Asia and to sign an historic trade agreement 
with Japan.
83
   Expansionism, and the economic benefits it brought, similarly proved 
central to U.S. national security.  “Should [new possessions] be obtained,” Pierce 
asserted during his Inaugural Address, “it will be through no grasping spirit, but with 
a view to obvious national interest and security, and in a manner entirely consistent 
with the strictest observance of national faith.”  From the 1898 Spanish-American 
War forward, the country promoted its national interests through formative political, 
military, and economic engagement in the international arena. 
 
2.  National Security Infrastructure 
 
The National Security Council (NSC) is “the principal forum for consideration of 
national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination.” 84  The President 
looks to the forum for advice and assistance in matters ranging from domestic, foreign 
and military, to intelligence and economic.
85
  It is thus somewhat surprising that the 
1947 National Security Act includes neither the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the 
Secretary of Commerce, as permanent (statutory) members of the NSC.   
Instead, the entity is chaired by the President, with formal membership extended 
to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.  The Chair 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the statutory military advisor, the Director of 
National Intelligence the statutory intelligence advisor, and the Director of National 
Drug Control Policy as the statutory drug control policy advisor.   
Under PDD-1, the NSC includes the Secretary of Treasury, and “When 
international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC’s regular 
attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chair of 
the Council of Economic Advisers.”86   
When the emphasis, however, is not international economic issues, the structure 
does not cement economic concerns into the discussion.  Nor does it contemplate the 
inclusion of Treasury or Commerce as an operational matter—i.e., when the 
intelligence community is deciding whether to develop a surveillance program.  Such 
matters are not brought directly to the NSC.
87
   
To the extent that the failure to include these members at the most basic level 
reflects a perspective that potentially sidelines economic concerns, the continued 
failure to build in strong representation at a programmatic level underscores the 
concern.  Economic concerns may be treated with seriousness, but they are not 
meaningfully integrated into the national security infrastructure. 
 
3.  Unintended Consequences 
 
There are various ways in which the failure to fully take account of the impact of 
the programs on U.S. industry may have acted to undermine U.S. security beyond 
weakening the economy.  The revelations, for instance, may well have driven enemies 
                                                        
83 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Japan, July 29, 1858, 12 Stat. 1051. 
84 PPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, Feb. 13, 2009. 
85 Id. 
86 PDD-1, at 2. 
87 DeRosa, supra note 18. 
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of the United States to use other countries’ Internet Service Providers, thus creating a 
gap in our insight into their operations.  They may similarly spur the initiation of 
encryption techniques that the NSA will have no means to address—making the 
country less secure because of the perceived overreach of the agency.  The revelations 
have also undermined U.S. credibility in challenging other countries’ efforts to obtain 
trade secrets and other information through state surveillance.  China provides one of 
the strongest examples. 
Online warfare between China and the United States has simmered in the 
background, until in early 2013 the Obama Administration began to make it center 
stage.  In January 2013 the New York Times reported that Chinese hackers had 
infiltrated its computers following a threat that if the paper insisted on publishing a 
story about its prime minister, consequences would follow.
 88
  The following month a 
security firm, Mandiant, revealed that the Chinese military unit 61398 had stolen data 
from U.S. companies and agencies.
 89
  In March 2013 President Obama’s national 
security advisor publicly urged China to reduce its surveillance efforts—following 
which classified documents leaked to the public demonstrated the extent to which 
China had infiltrated U.S. government servers.
90
  In May 2013 the National Security 
Advisor flew to China to lay the groundwork for a summit, in which cyber 
surveillance would prove center stage.
91
  Two days before the Obama-Xi meeting was 
scheduled to take place, The Guardian ran the first story on the NSA programs.
 92
  On 
June 7, when Obama raised the question of Chinese espionage, Xi responded by 
quoting the Guardian and suggesting that the U.S. should not be lecturing the Chinese 
about surveillance.
93
 
Although differences may mark the two countries approaches to surveillance (e.g., 
in one case for economic advantage, in the other for political or security advantage), 
the broader translation for the global community has been one in which the United 
States has lost high ground to try to restrict cybersurveillance by other countries. 
 
V.  STEPS REQUIRED TO REDRESS THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
Numerous steps could be taken by Congress to address the situation in which U.S. 
industry currently finds itself.  The most effective and influential decision that 
legislators could take would be to curb the NSA’s authorities under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  This action has two components: first, ending the 
telephony metadata collection program and, second, restricting the use of to/from, or 
about collection under upstream interceptions.  Both programs would further benefit 
from greater transparency, to make it clear that their aim is to prevent foreign 
aggression and to prevent threats to U.S. national security—not to engage in the 
interception of trade secrets or to build dossiers on other countries’ populations.   
The second most effective change that could be undertaken would be to introduce 
stricter privacy controls on U.S. companies, in the process bringing the United States 
into closer line with the principles that dominate in the European Union.  The two 
entities are not as far apart as the dialogue might have one assume, and so changes 
required in this sphere would be minimal.  Together, these two alterations—curbing 
the NSA surveillance programs and providing increased consumer protections for 
                                                        
88 Kurt Eichenwald, How Edward Snowden Escalated Cyber War, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 2013. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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privacy—would allow U.S. industry to argue changed circumstance to allow 
companies to again become competitive for contracts and markets to which they seek 
access.   
A third alteration that would make a substantial difference over the longer term 
relates to the national security infrastructure.  The current failure of the United States 
to integrate economic concerns creates a vulnerability for the country in terms of the 
breadth and depth of programs subsequently adopted.  New thought needs to be given 
to how to take on board—and mitigate—potentially devastating economic 
consequences of government surveillance efforts. 
 
A.  FISA Alterations  
 
In addition to the economic impact of NSA telephony metadata collection 
(discussed, infra), the program runs contrary to Congressional intent in introducing 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, contradicts the statutory language, and 
violates the Fourth Amendment.
94
  In 2014 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board came to a similar conclusion,
95
 as did the President’s own appointed Review 
Group, charged with considering the telephony metadata collection program, in 
2013.
96
   
Accordingly, the President announced on January 17, 2014 that he was “ordering 
a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists, 
and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need without the 
government holding this bulk metadata.” 97   The alternative approach was to be 
developed by March 28, 2014.  Nine months later, on September 13, 2014, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved DOJ’s request to extend the 
program for another 90 days—without any transition program in place. 
Although the President issued a new presidential directive in January 2014 for 
U.S. signals intelligence activities both at home and abroad, the classified nature of 
parts of the document, international skepticism about the Administration’s 
commitment to privacy, and the failure of the Administration to make good on its 
promise of transition to a new program meant that the global community, with good 
reason, has questioned whether anything has really changed.  No new legislation is in 
place that would provide limits on the Executive Branch beyond those that operated 
for the duration of the bulk collection program. 
As a matter of Section 702 and the interception of international content, both 
PRISM and upstream collection present global concerns—neither of which have been 
addressed through any legislative change.  The existence of these programs, while 
perhaps statutorily consistent with the FISA Amendments Act, as well as 
constitutionally sufficient with regard to the interception of non-U.S. persons 
                                                        
94 Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37(3) 
HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y, 757-900 (2014), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2360&context=facpub 
95 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM 
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, Jan. 23, 2014, available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/23/final_report_1-23-14.pdf. 
96 PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:  REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES, Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-review-
boards-report/674/. 
97 Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, Jan. 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence. 
 15 
communications, where the individual is reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States, as a policy matter, goes some way towards undermining international 
confidence in U.S. companies. 
The Fourth Amendment does not reach non-U.S. persons based overseas who lack 
a substantial connection to the United States.
98
  Writing for the Court in United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that “the people” referred to 
in the Fourth Amendment indicate a particular group—not merely people qua 
people.
99
  His reading stems from a deeply Aristotelian approach:  i.e., one that 
emphasizes membership in the polis (     ), or political community, as a concomitant 
of forming a structure of government.
100
  As members of the polis, U.S. persons, both 
distributively and collectively, obtain the protections of the constitution.   
Looked at in this regard, the Constitution itself embodies the collective 
organization of “the people” into one entity.  “U.S. persons” and “the people” are 
therefore one and the same.  The “right of the people” thus refers to a collective group 
of individuals “who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”101  
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient contact with the 
United States to satisfy the “substantial connections” aspect of the majority’s decision.  
Those that do point in seemingly different directions.
102
  At a minimum, however, it 
would be extraordinary to assume that simply because an individual uses a U.S. 
company, he or she thereby gains the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  This was 
the basic argument underlying the “modernization” of FISA in the first place, to take 
account of bad actors, communicating overseas, who would suddenly fall within the 
more protective FISA regime merely because their communications happened to come 
within U.S. territory by nature of the carrier in question. 
Even recognizing, however, that few constitutional barriers may apply to the 
programmatic use of Section 702 insofar as it is applied to non-U.S. persons (leaving 
aside the questions that accompany the incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
information, as well as entirely domestic conversations), as a matter of policy, 
certainly both PRISM and the use of to/from or about collection in upstream gathering 
has dramatically undermined U.S. industry.  As a matter of policy, therefore, greater 
restrictions, more transparency, and more effective oversight of the international 
collection of content may help to alter the situation with regard to the skepticism 
expressed towards U.S. companies. 
 
B.  Privacy Law Harmonization 
 
Much ink has been spilled on the cultural and practical differences between the U.S. 
and EU with regard to data protection and privacy law.  These differences have been 
over-blown.   
                                                        
98 Section 702 and the collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38(1) HARV. J. OF L. & 
PUB. POL’Y, (2015), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1355/. 
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There are myriad ways in which the two regions reflect a similar approach.  Just 
as the United States’ Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy, for instance, 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms embraces the same.
103
  These documents constitutionally 
ground two fundamental liberty interests in the respective regions’ governing 
frameworks:  (a) the right to privacy, and (b) freedom from arbitrary invasion of one’s 
private sphere.  In the European Union, these liberties are supported by EU-wide 
directives, such as the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the EU Internet 
Privacy Law of 2002.  Further, in both the EU and the U.S. such liberty interests are 
protected through national legislation, in which a judicial remedy is provided for a 
breach of the right to privacy.
104
  The manner in which these rights are treated is 
similarly consistent.  In both spheres, these rights are offset against the obligations 
owed by the data holder to the individual to whom the information relates.
105
 
As a substantive matter, the two regions have adopted similar provisions.  In both 
the EU and the U.S., for instance, heightened protections are provided for what is 
known as personally-identifiable information.
106
  A series of exceptions to the 
dominant structure is provided in two central areas:  security (including, e.g., criminal 
law, public security, defense, and national security) and freedom of expression (such 
as with regard to journalism, literary pursuits, artistic expression, and political 
opinions).
107
  To ensure that the substantive measures reflect the underlying 
constitutional principles, both regions insist on minimization—i.e., that the 
information collected on individuals be limited to what is strictly necessary for the 
purposes delineated by statute.
108
 
Both the U.S. and the EU have established a set of substantive requirements 
related to individuals’ knowledge that data about them is being collected, stored, and 
possibly shared with others.  Consent, for instance, is central to both systems.
109
  
Much has been made in regard to the distinction between the opt-in (European 
approach) versus the opt-out (American approach).  What has been lost, however, is 
that both approaches rely on the consent of the subject (subject to specific exceptions, 
above), in order to proceed with data gathering, analysis, and distribution.  To 
                                                        
103 Compare "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
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Act of 1984, the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2001, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
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105 Compare 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 25, and U.S. laws, supra note 5. 
106 Compare, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 26, and the Systems of Records Notice requirement 
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Data Retention Directive (creating exceptions for criminal law). 
108 Compare 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 28 and 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
109 Compare 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 30 and U.S. laws, supra note 5. 
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facilitate this structure, both regions also require that notice be provided to targets and 
that individuals have the right to access information that is held about them.
110
  
Individuals, in both systems, have the right to object to particular information, and in 
both systems, the data holder has a duty to ensure that the information is accurate and 
kept up to date.
111
 
Keeping in mind the consistencies between the two systems, and the benefits to be 
gained for U.S. industry from emphasizing harmony, there are two areas where the 
two regions depart could be addressed through legislative reform:  namely, 
recognition of residual rights in third party data, and the creation of a comprehensive, 
privacy-protective regime, as opposed to the piecemeal approach that currently marks 
U.S. law. 
 
1.  Residual Rights in Third Party Data 
 
One central question that divides the United States from numerous other countries 
and regions—including the European Union—centers on who owns an individual’s 
data.  In the United States, since Smith v. Maryland (addressing pen registers and trap 
and trace devices), and U.S. v. Miller (focusing on financial records), all three 
branches have treated information held by third parties as lacking an individual right 
to privacy.
112
   
In contrast, the European Union considers that the individual who has provided 
data to a third party to still have a privacy interest in the information.
113
  The recent 
European Court decision, recognizing the right to anonymity, necessarily presupposes 
a continued interest in data, even once it is obtained by a third party. 
The difference between the approaches is central to understanding how new 
technologies, such as social network analysis, cloud computing, and data mining, have 
deepened the privacy interests implicated in third party handling of data.  New 
technologies allow information to be generated about which even those to whom the 
data relates are unaware.  To say that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in this information rather flies in the face of common sense.   
The Supreme Court appears to be coming to this conclusion as well.  In United 
States v. Jones, the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance involving 
the placement of a GPS chip on a vehicle.
114
  Although ultimately decided on grounds 
of trespass, a shadow majority expressed strong concern about the implications of 
long-term surveillance. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investigations, long-term monitoring 
“impinges on expectations of privacy.”115 The nature of new technologies mattered: 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the 
monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, closed-circuit 
television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic 
toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements of motorists 
who choose to make use of their convenience. Many motorists purchase cars 
                                                        
110 Compare, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 38 (notice) and 41 (right of access), and U.S. laws, 
supra note 5. 
111 Compare, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Art. 14 (right to object) and Art. 6 (accurate data); and U.S. laws, 
supra note 5. 
112 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
113 See, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 47. 
114 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
115 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the 
car’s location at any time so that roadside assistance may be provided if 
needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.
116
 
 
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire basis for 
third party doctrine. Specifically, in light of the level of intrusiveness represented by 
modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”117 Sotomayor pointed out: 
 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text 
to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses 
with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the 
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.
118
 
 
She continued, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”119 
Congress has an opportunity to take the lead by recognizing the right to privacy 
still held by data holders when information is collected by third parties.  It can then 
craft statutes accordingly, ensuring that U.S. companies offer greater protections for 
consumers, in the process allowing industry to offset the claims of its overseas 
competitors. 
 
2.  Legal Framework 
 
Thus far, U.S. high technology companies have been subject to a very different 
statutory and regulatory structure than that which prevails in the European Union.  In 
the United States, privacy rights have largely been protected via a series of vertical 
statutes dealing with specific areas, such as children using the Internet, driver-related 
information, and medical data.   
In the EU, in contrast, privacy has been protected by a more omnibus-type 
approach, which horizontally reaches across a number of areas.  This approach is 
reflected in the 1995 Directive as well as the national legislation implementing the 
directive on a country-by-country basis.
120
  
The vertical statutory scheme has been successful in addressing particular, 
discreet areas where privacy interests reside.  However, outside of these narrow 
exceptions, in the interests of encouraging innovation, the high technology sector has 
been left largely unregulated by federal statute.  The assumption has been that market 
forces would adjust to protect privacy interests.   
                                                        
 116. Id. at 963. 
 117. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. 
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120 See, e.g., U.K. Data Protection Act of 1998, Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act of 2001, France’s 
Data Protection Act of 1978 (revised in 2004), Finland’s Act on the Amendment of the Personal Data Act 
(986) 2000; Denmark’s Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429, May 2000; Greece’s Law No. 
2472 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, April 1997. 
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The advantage of this approach has been to give high tech companies a significant 
amount of flexibility, allowing them to independently gauge the appropriate level of 
privacy protections to give to consumers. 
The drawback has been that privacy itself has become commoditized, with 
companies actually making money off of selling consumers’ privacy interests.   
Consider Google and its email service, Gmail, for instance.  The company reads 
and analyzes all of its customers’ emails, it watches what people read, it looks at web 
sites people visit, and it records what people purchase.  The company then sells access 
to customers’ private lives to companies who want to advertise.  Thus, the mother 
who sends an email to her son raising concern about depression may receive an ad 
within hours for psychiatric services, even as a pregnant woman merely looking at 
cribs, may within days receive mail through the U.S. post, advertising sales at Babies 
R’Us. 
In September 2013 Google lost an effort in the 9
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals for 
judicial review of a lower court’s refusal to dismiss multiple class action lawsuits 
accusing Google of violating the Wiretap Act.  U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh 
determined that the case is too far along to suffer delays.  Koh’s interpretation of the 
Electronic communications Privacy Act limits the “ordinary course of business” 
exception—not least because Google’s practice violates its own policies. 121   The 
lawsuits, filed in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, at great 
expense, are proceeding. 
Capitalizing on private data represents a significant breach of the right to privacy. 
Instead of protecting privacy, the market has exploited it for monetary gain.  In the 
United States and overseas, individuals are concerned about the lack of protections 
afforded.  Congressional legislation could fix this problem by bringing high 
technology within the broader statutory framework and thus closing a gap in the 
existing law. 
 
3.  Safe Harbor Considerations 
 
In the wake of the Snowden documents, the EU Commission issued a report 
recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending significant changes, 
including required disclosure of cloud computing and other service provider contracts 
used by Safe Harbor members.   
The Safe Harbor provisions, developed 1999-2000 by the U.S. Commerce 
Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the European Union, 
created a narrow bridge between the United States and EU.  At the time, the European 
Parliament, which did not bind the European Commission, rejected the Safe Harbor 
provisions by a vote of 279 to 259, with twenty-two abstentions.  Chief amongst 
European concerns was the failure of the agreement to provide adequate protections. 
In light of the massive data breaches we have had over the past five years in the 
United States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology industry, and the 
ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance, Europeans are even less supportive of the Safe 
Harbor provisions.  They amount to a self-regulated scheme in which the Federal 
Trade Commission merely looks at whether a company, which has voluntarily opted-
in to the program, fails to do what it has stated it will do, within the bounds of its own 
privacy policy.  Stronger measures are necessary to restore European confidence in 
U.S. high technology companies. 
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C.  Establishing Economic Security as National Security 
 
Economic strength as national security, as was previously discussed, is not a new 
concept.  The Founding itself was premised, in part, on the importance of economic 
security as being vital to U.S. national interests.  In 1787 the Articles of Confederation 
were written out of existence on economic security grounds, as the country sought to 
reassure the international community that it was a viable trading partner.  Since that 
time, the United States has at times had to remind itself of the importance of the 
economy to U.S. national interests.  We are once again at such a time. 
High technology is a vital part of the U.S. economy.  It is both a symbolic and 
actual manifestation of the country’s commitment to innovation in every sphere of 
life.  It plays to the United States’ strengths as a nation.  It has the potential to change 
regimes, to alter political relationships, and to shape the daily lives of people around 
the globe.  And it deserves special attention.  The danger is that U.S. industry will 
become less competitive and that the U.S. will thus lose its dominance in the Internet 
economic sphere. 
To some extent, we do, structurally, pay some attention to the importance of the 
economy.  But many consequential decisions are thus not aired in full light of the 
possible implications for U.S. national security.
122
  One way Congress could rectify 
this would be to take a look at how to integrate economic concerns, as a statutory 
matter, into the national security infrastructure. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To redress the negative effects that have followed from public awareness of the NSA 
programs conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of 
the FISA Amendments Act, the most important step that Congress could take would 
be to reign in the surveillance authorities themselves, in the process providing greater 
transparency and oversight.  An alteration in U.S. privacy law would also help to 
reassure U.S. customers and individuals located outside domestic bounds that 
consumer privacy is protected, thus allowing industry accurately to assert that the 
circumstances have changed.  Consideration of how to integrate economic concerns 
into the national security infrastructure would further help to emphasize the 
importance of taking account of the impact of new initiatives on the United States.  
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